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Twenty years ago, Professor Mary Ann Glendon turned her atten-
tion to the relationship of decedents' estates and labor law to contem-
porary family life, which resulted in the publication of her book, The
New Family and the New Property.' She was the first comparative law
scholar knowledgeable in the three fields to see certain connections.
For example, in decedents' estates, she saw the connection between
how family relationships are perceived within the family structure it-
self, and the assumption the law makes about those relationships, and
whether the assignment of property upon divorce laws should mirror
succession laws. She noted that one's job or profession (and the tan-
gible and intangible economic benefits that accrued to it), not one's
family ties, was becoming the important source of one's wealth and
status. 2 Further, Professor Glendon saw, as few others had seen, that
at the same time that the marital tie was weakening by the advent of
no-fault divorce, the law was stepping in to provide greater protection
for the employment relationship. Subsequently, however, the employ-
ment relationship itself has become insecure. 3 Put simply, while in
the 1980s it was easier to divorce a spouse than for an employer to fire
t Copyright © 1998 Sanford N. Katz
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I should like to thank Walter 0.
Weyrauch for his comments on a draft of this essay.
1 See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981).
2 Professor Glendon discusses this point as well in MARY ANN GLENDON, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 135 (1996).
3 This phenomenon is discussed in Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Commu-
nitarianism at Work, 1993 BYU L. REv. 727, 736 (1993) (citations omitted):
It may be that instability increasingly characterizes many of the significant
relationships among Americans: employment relationships in the U.S. now
last an average of 4.5 years, while the average marriage lasts but seven.
Trends are not wholly clear, but the average length of both may be on the
way down.
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an employee, since then there has been a dramatic weakening in both
marital and employment relationships. 4
Professor Glendon believed that treating marriage as a "partner-
ship" of equals placed the emphasis on the individual in the family,
overshadowing the sense of community. To her, the partnership
model of marriage gave rise to a new ideology for compensating a
spouse through equitable distribution, or what she would later label
"discretionary distribution." 5
In her writings, Professor Glendon has worried about the plight
of women and children who need legal protection in their post-di-
vorce lives. She argued that in awarding alimony and assigning prop-
erty upon divorce, a distinction should be made between marriages
with children and those without, as exists in many succession laws. In
the latter case, she proposed that courts adopt a "children-first princi-
ple"-a principle that requires an inquiry into the welfare of the chil-
4 Professors Kohler and Finkin have written:
In his Commentaries, William Blackstone famously observed that the
"three great relationships of private life are" those of "husband and wife,"
.parent and child," and "master and servant."...
Family and work relationships may be elemental to any form of stable
and well-ordered social and political life. But, in the American context,
there is no denying that at least the first two of the bonds that Blackstone
enumerates hardly are flourishing. Although other nations are beginning to
become more competitive in this arena, the United States continues to have
the highest divorce rate in the world. As one group of researchers report
about the American domestic scene, "the probability that a marriage taking
place today will end in divorce or permanent separation is calculated to be a
staggering 60 percent." Similarly, Frank Furstenberg and Andrew Cherlin
estimate that sixty per cent of children born in the United States during the
1990's will live in a single-parent family before age sixteen. If employment,
like marriage and, at least for men, parenthood, comes to assume the char-
acter of a spot (one hesitates to say a "just-in-time") relationship, we should
not be surprised. One need pass no value judgments on any of these devel-
opments to suggest that they are not entirely unrelated. Although it may
represent something of a "trailing" indicator, there is no reason to expect
that the employment bond, which we strongly tend to characterize as repre-
senting purely economic association, should be any more durable than life's
other significant relations. Our habits not only belay any such expectations,
but prepare us to accept serial affiliations as the norm.
Thomas C. Kohler & Matthew W. Finkin, Bonding and Flexibility: Employment Ordering in
aRelationlessAge, 46 AM.J. COMP. L. 1101, 1122-23 (1998) (punctuation altered) (cita-
tions omitted).
5 Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REv. 1553, 1556




dren of the marriage as trumping other considerations. 6 Professor
Glendon's work in family law has had a major impact on the economic
aspects of marriage and divorce.
7
At the same time as Professor Glendon was engaged in her re-
search for that book, Professor Walter 0. Weyrauch and I were study-
ing the application of legal theory to the practice of family law. One
particular part of our work which related to hers was our observation
that, throughout our history, there have been a variety of models of
families found in America that were established through formal and
informal marriages,. through no marital relationship at all, or by the
use of certain procedural devices.8 As she wrote (and we agreed),
"the new family is no family in the sense of a single model that can be
called typical for modern industrialized societies. The new family is a
concept that represents a variety of co-existing family types."9 It
should be noted, however, that the law has not treated the family as a
protected legal unit like a corporation or a labor union. Rather, fam-
ily law is the study of the establishment, supervision, and termination
or reorganization of family and family-like relationships like husband
and wife, parent and child, and unrelated persons living with each
other in a committed relationship.' 0 Family law also examines the in-
dividual's role in those relationships.
6 See Glendon, Family Law Reform, supra note 5, at 1560-61; see also MARY ANN
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 94-95, 98-101 (1987).
7 Most recently Professor Glendon's work has been cited in AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSoLUTION: ANALYSIS AND REcOMMENDA-
TIONS § 4.07 (Proposed Final Draft Part I, February 14, 1997).
8 SeeWALTER 0. WEYRAUCH & SANFORD N. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSI-
TION 115-71 (1983). Our later study builds on that work. See WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH
ET AL., FAMILY LAw-LEGAL CONCEPTS AND CHANGING HUMAN RELATIONSHIP (1994).
See also Walter 0. Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage-An Appraisal of Trends in
Family Organization, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 88 (1960).
9 GLENDON, supra note 1, at 4.
10 Professors Joseph Goldstein and Jay Katz have written:
Family law .. .is defined as the process for deciding what relationships
should be labelled "family," under what circumstances such relationships
may be established, administered, and reorganized, and what consequences
should accompany these determinations. In perceiving the cycle of state
and family interaction in terms of the three basic problems for decision-
establishment, administration, and reorganization-we further define family
law to include the processes for determining to what persons or agencies,
should be assigned, under what circumstances, the role of promulgating,
invoking, implementing, and appraising these decisions.
JOSEPH GOLmsEIN & JAY KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 1 (1965).
1998] 1253
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
We also saw that family law was in flux and was difficult to concep-
tualize.11 Family law responded to the rights movements of the sixties
and seventies. As Americans changed their behavior, lawyers and
judges reacted to new patterns of living arrangements by reshaping
and reinterpreting old laws, creating legal constructs accompanied by
legal language to fit these patterns for legal planning or for resolving
conflicts. Eventually, what first was a legal fiction became a reality,
and a body of law followed by language developed to conform to the
construct. This has been particularly true of marriage, now regarded
in the law as a partnership contract, and marriage-like relationships,
which in certain circumstances are now treated as de facto mar-
riages. 12 By using the partnership metaphor with emphasis on the in-
dividual in that relationship, equality in marriage seems to have taken
root. Whether this equality is in fact meaningful or merely rhetoric
depends upon individual cases in particular contexts.1 3 That any mar-
riage has elements of a co-ownership for mutual profit can hardly be
doubted.
In this essay honoring Professor Mary Ann Glendon, I should like
to discuss the contract of partnerships concept of marriage as it ap-
11 On this point Professor Carl Schneider has written: "It is hard to produce a
systematic view of an unsystematic subject, and perhaps family law must always be ad
hoc, responsive to local conditions, sensitive to the day's sensibilities, and willing to
compromise irreconcilable differences." Carl E. Schneider, The Next Step: Definition,
Generalization, and Theory in American Family Law, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1039, 1048
(1985).
12 Illustrative of this point is the practice of treating property acquired during
pre-marital cohabitation as marital property subject to division upon divorce. See
Moriarty v. Stone, 668 N.E.2d 1338 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); In re Marriage of Dubnicay,
830 P.2d 608 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Malek v. Malek, 768 P.2d 243 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989);
In re Marriage of Burton, 758 P.2d 394 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); Chestnut v. Chestnut, 499
N.E.2d 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
13 My co-authors Walter 0. Weyrauch, Frances Olsen, and I have written:
A major trend over the past two centuries has been toward greater
equality in marriage. This greater equality has generally taken the form of
allowing the wife more autonomy within the marriage. While women have
benefited from this increased autonomy, some observers believe that the sol-
idarity of "the family" has suffered. It is striking how few reforms have aimed
directly at allowing wives greater say in family decisions-democratizing the
family-rather than just at allowing wives to opt out of decisions made by the
husband, such as the "family" domicile....
Most commentators support the trend toward increasing equality within
marriage. Less consensus exists, however, about what greater equality in
marriage really means and about who should bear the brunt of the disrup-
tion during the period of readjustment.
WEYRAUCH ET AL, supra note 8, at 309. See also Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1530-35 (1983).
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plies to antenuptial agreements, cohabitation contracts, and marital
property, the three contexts about which Professor Glendon has writ-
ten.14 First, it is important to define marriage as a contract of
partnership.
II. MARRIAGE AS CONTrACr
Marriage in American law has ordinarily been thought of as a sta-
tus entered into for life and regulated by the state. The American
legal source of this concept is the nineteenth century United States
Supreme Court case of Maynard v. HilL15 In that case, the Court held
that the legislative assembly of the territory of Oregon had the author-
ity to dissolve the "bonds of matrimony" between David Maynard and
his wife Lydia. It was in that case that Justice Field wrote what has
perhaps become the most famous quotation about marriage in Ameri-
can appellate court opinions:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having
more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any
other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legis-
lature. That body prescribes the age at which parties may contract
to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage,
the duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property
rights of both, present and prospective, and the acts which may con-
stitute grounds for its dissolution.16
Thirty-seven years before Maynard was decided, the Supreme
Court of Florida stated in Ponder v. Graham17 that marriage was a con-
tract. This concept was, of course, not new, having its roots in com-
mon law, incorporated in colonial practice, and is consistent with
what Professor Grossberg has described as a "displacement of pa-
triarchalism by contractualism" in the nineteenth century.'8 However,
14 See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 61; GLENDON, supra note 2, at 135-40.
15 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
16 I& at 205.
17 4 Fla. 23 (1851).
18 MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 19 (1985). Professor Michael
Grossberg's excellent work on the law and the family in nineteenth century America
discusses this point. He has written that in the post-revolutionary era:
[T] he law continued to portray marriage as a civil contract, [but] in a vital
transition the accent shifted from the first word to the second. The new
emphasis was on the consensual nature of marriage. It also reflected the
broader use of contract as the central metaphor for social and economic
relations in early nineteenth-century America .... Contractualism gained
strength from the same forces that were eroding the hierarchical conception
of society. Rather than viewing the body politic as an amalgam of interde-
pendent, status-defined groups, contract ideology stemmed from a world
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the Florida court's labeling of marriage as a contract in the context of
the case did not mean that parties were completely free to set their
own terms. It meant that the Florida legislature had no power to dis-
solve a marriage contract, for by so doing it would be impairing the
right to contract. Yet Justice Semmes' words in Ponder help to define
marriage as contract. He wrote, "I know of no reason why the word
contract, as used in the [C]onstitution, should be restricted to those
of pecuniary nature, and not embrace that of marriage, involving as it
does, considerations of the most interesting character and vital impor-
tance to society, to government, and the contracting parties." 19 The
two concepts of marriage, that of status and that of a special kind of
contract, seemingly contradictory, have co-existed throughout the
nineteenth century and are still referred to today.20
In contemporary times, however, it is difficult to fit marriage
neatly into the legal construct called contract.21 Normally contract
law assumes freedom of contract, party autonomy, and equal bargain-
ing power. The marriage contract is not totally free of governmental
regulation, and therefore parties have limited freedom of choice.
Party autonomy and equal bargaining power may not be present in
view whose lode star was the untrammeled autonomy of the individual Will.
Relations of all kinds were to be governed by the intentions, not the ascribed
status, of their makers. The English philosopher Sir Henry Maine character-
ized this transition as the "movement from status to contract."
Id.
The concept of marriage as partnership could also be found in eighteenth cen-
tury America. Professor Grossberg finds support in quotes from the 1792 Lady's
Magazine:
A self-described "Matrimonial Republican" defined the new perception....
She objected to the word "obey in the marriage service because it is a gen-
eral word, without limitations or definitions." Instead, the writer insisted
that the "obedience between man and wife, I conceive, is, or ought to be,
mutual. Marriage ought never to be considered as a contract between a su-
perior and inferior, but a reciprocal union of interests, an implied partner-
ship of interests, where all differences are accommodated by conference;
and decision admits of no retrospect."
Id. (citations omitted).
19 Ponder, 4 Fla. at 45.
20 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190 (1888), for the proposition that "marriage is a social relation subject to the
State's police power."). See also Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 268 (Fla. 1973) (citing
Ponder for the proposition that "marriage is a contract" in holding that Florida's no-
fault divorce law was constitutional).
21 Professor Ira Ellman has made this point in Ira Ellman, The Theory of Alimony,
77 CAL. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1989). See also Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as




marriage. Perhaps the most that can be said is that while in the past
the marital relationship was wholly defined by the state,22 now certain
aspects of the relationship can be negotiated by the parties. Also, by
including the marriage contract within the world of contract, one ef-
fect is a change in the attitudes of the couple and the courts. Pre-
sumptions that actions are motivated by a donative intent are less
difficult to overcome. Vocabulary changes from words of intimacy to
the language of commerce (for example, profit and investment) and
self-interest. Spouses become parties, participation becomes contribu-
tion, and divorce becomes dissolution.
III. ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
If the terms of the marriage relationship were completely state-
regulated with no opportunity for couples to set their own terms for
their relationship, like a contract of adhesion, or the economic conse-
quences of the termination of that relationship, antenuptial agree-
ments could not exist to the extent they do now. In other words, the
concept of marriage as partnership contract provides the legal foun-
dation for antenuptial agreements. Professor Glendon believes that
the movement toward discretionary distribution in the assignment of
property under equitable distribution statutes in divorce necessitates
the agreement for couples with significant, or potentially significant,
financial resources. 23
22 Using the contract metaphor, the marriage contract, while not based on a
printed form, has some of the elements of a contract of adhesion in the sense that
some marital duties are imposed by law. See WEmRAUCH & KATZ, supra note 8, at 2.
The Massachusetts case of French v. McAnarney, 195 N.E. 714 (Mass. 1935) illus-
trates this point. In French, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to
enforce an antenuptial agreement, which effectively released the husband from his
common law duty to support his wife. In reaching this decision, the court stated:
The status of the parties as husband and wife was fixed when the marriage
was solemnized. A marriage cannot be avoided or the obligations imposed
by law as incident to the relation of husband and wife be relaxed by previous
agreement between the parties. Marriage is not merely a contract between
the parties. It is the foundation of the family. It is a social institution of the
highest importance.... The moment the marriage relation comes into exist-
ence, certain rights and duties necessarily incident to that relation spring
into being. One of these duties is the obligation imposed by law upon the
husband to support his wife .... The enlarged contractual capacity con-
ferred upon married women by [Massachusetts law] does not relieve the hus-
band from this liability.
Id at 715-16 (citations omitted).
23 See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 63-68; GLENDON, supra note 2, at 135-40; Glen-
don, Family Law Reform, supra note 5, at 1565-70 (1984).
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Historically, antenuptial agreements were entered into by wealthy
people in their desire to preserve their estate plan, which was drafted
before their marriage. Or the agreements were used by older people,
usually after they had already been married at least once, who wanted
an agreement that would order the distribution of assets upon death.
They might do so to protect the financial interests of children from a
previous marriage. If litigation over agreements arose, courts would
interpret them against the background of the then contemporary so-
cial conditions and community values.24 If a term in an antenuptial
24 The case of In re Duncan's Estate, 285 P. 757 (Colo. 1930), illustrates this
point. In that case Charles Duncan died intestate. The administrator of his estate
denied his widow her widow's allowance, claiming that the couple's antenuptial agree-
ment barred her claim. The agreement provided that:
[S] hould at any time a condition exist that would disturb the harmony of the
married life and domestic relations of said parties, they agree to a legal sepa-
ration, with the following stipulations: The party of the first part [the hus-
band] agrees to make a settlement with the party of the second part [the
wife] at the rate of $100.00 for each year they shall have lived together as
man and wife .... The said party of the second part agrees to accept said
settlement within 24 hours of the time the said parties shall have ceased to
live together as man and wife. The said party of the second part further
agrees to vacate the house, rooms or premises the said parties shall have
occupied, and to take from said house, rooms or premises all articles of
household goods, furnishings, and wearing apparel which are her personal
property, within 24 hours of receiving the foregoing settlement, and with no
expense to the said party of the first part. In consideration of the foregoing,
the party of the second part does hereby further agree to forever release the
said party of the first part, his heirs and assigns, from any and all claims for
alimony, support, maintenance, dower, or wife's or widow's rights; and not
to contest any action for divorce that may be brought by the party of the first
part.
Id. at 757.
In less than a year the couple separated. The wife acknowledged the receipt of
$110.00 in full settlement of all claims she had against her husband.
In holding that the antenuptial agreement was void and against public policy, the
Supreme Court of Colorado stated that:
The antenuptial contract was a wicked device to evade the laws applicable to
marriage relations, property rights, and divorces.... It was nothing more, in
effect, than an attempt, on the part of the deceased, in whose favor the con-
tract was drawn, to legalize prostitution, under the name of marriage, at the
price of $100 per year.
Id.
The court concluded its opinion with the following statement about marriage:
The marriage relation lies at the foundation of our civilization. Marriage
promotes public and private morals, and advances the well-being of society
and social order. The marriage relation is so sacred in character that it is
indissoluble except in conformity with legislative requirements and the sol-
1258 (VOL- 73:5
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agreement was written in contemplation of divorce, either the term or
the entire agreement would have been unenforceable, due to the
strong belief in the permanence of marriage and the possibility that
enforcement could leave a spouse (probably the wife, given the social
and economic reality of the time) destitute.25
In 1970 the Supreme Court of Florida broke with tradition and,
in Posner v. Posner,26 decided that in light of changes in social condi-
tions in which divorce was a fact of life, an antenuptial agreement that
settled alimony and property rights upon divorce was not contrary to
public policy and ought to be enforced.27 Although the facts in Posner
concerned the couple's successful attempt to order privately their eco-
nomic relationship should they divorce, the case's holding has had
much broader significance. It provided the opportunity for couples
to define their marital relationship, delineating the roles each person
will play, who will make what decisions, and how children will be
raised. Professor Weyrauch has suggested that even though some of
these matters are legally unenforceable, "they function in a manner
comparable to the traditional requirement of legal consideration or
emn decree of the court. It cannot be annulled by contract, or at the plea-
sure of the parties.
Id. at 758.
The outcome of this case would most likely be the same in 1998 although a con-
temporary judge might omit the lofty statement about marriage.
25 The leading case on antenuptial agreements in Massachusetts is Osborne v. Os-
borne, 428 N.E.2d 810 (Mass. 1981). In that case Chief Justice Hennessey traced the
history of the enforcement of antenuptial agreements. He wrote:
In many jurisdictions it has been held that an antenuptial contract made in
contemplation of divorce is void as against public policy. The reason most
frequently given for invalidating such contracts are (1) they are not compati-
ble with and denigrate the status of marriage, (2) they tend to facilitate di-
vorce by providing inducements to end the marriage, and (3) a contract
waiving or minimizing alimony may turn a spouse into a ward of the State.
Id. at 814 (citations omitted).
26 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970). Although Posner v. Posner is widely cited as being
ground-breaking, Hudson v, Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960), predates Posner. In
Hudson, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld a premarital contract in which ali-
mony was waived.
27 Justice Roberts wrote:
We know of no community or society in which the public policy that
condemned a husband and wife to a lifetime of misery as an alternative to
the opprobrium of divorce still exists. And a tendency to recognize this
change in public policy and to give effect to the antenuptial agreements of
the parties relating to divorce is clearly discernible.
Posner, 233 So. 2d at 384. Perhaps Justice Roberts was restricting his remarks to the
United States. In 1970 a limited number of countries did not allow divorce.
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form in the law of contracts by safeguarding deliberation and deter-
mining the intent of the parties. '28
The major question about antenuptial agreements is whether
they really are contracts governed by conventional contract law doc-
trine 29 or whether they are a special kind of contract peculiar to fam-
ily law. 30 Professor Glendon has criticized the direction courts have
taken in interpreting antenuptial agreements. In adopting "the spirit
of discretionary distribution" into these agreements, she believes
judges have introduced a major element of uncertainty.3' Also, if one
takes seriously that stability and predictability are two of the funda-
mental principles of contract law, their absence is a fatal flaw. What
seems to be becoming more clear is that contracts dealing with do-
mestic relations-antenuptial agreements being an example-present
a special contract model in which certain kinds of questions are
posed. Whereas in commercial contracts, questions about industry
practices and the impact on the economic relations of the parties-
for example, maximizing profits-may be relevant to deciding a re-
sult, different questions, including family policy considerations that
will be discussed, are posed as to whether an antenuptial agreement
should be enforced.
Two theoretical questions asked when enforcement of a commer-
cial contract is at issue concern process and substance. The same
questions are relevant in antenuptial agreements but the basis for re-
sponding to them is quite different. A special body of law has devel-
oped to test the validity of antenuptial agreements, and it can be
divided into matters dealing with process and substance.
In commercial contracts, other than adhesion contracts, courts
are ordinarily not concerned with whether the terms of a contract are
fair if true equal bargaining exists. What is of concern is that the pro-
cess by which the contract was entered into is free from misrepresenta-
28 Walter 0. Weyrauch, Metamorphoses of Marriage, 13 FAM. L.Q. 415, 420 (1980).
29 In Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990), the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania stated that "[p] renuptial agreements are contracts, and, as such, should
be evaluated under the same criteria as are applicable to other types of contracts."
The court was unwilling to nullify an antenuptial agreement that had been signed on
the eve of the couple's wedding. The court felt that "[c] ontracting parties are nor-
mally bound by their agreements, without regard to whether the terms thereof were
read and fully understood and irrespective of whether the agreements embodied rea-
sonable or good bargains." Id.
30 Section 2 of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act illustrates one break with
the common law of contracts in stating that "[a] premarital agreement must be in
writing and signed by both parties. It is enforceable without consideration." UNIF.
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 372 (1987).
31 See Glendon, Family Law Reform, supra note 5, at 1567.
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tion, coercion, and duress.3 2 In antenuptial agreements both the
process and the terms must be fair. A fair process includes a full dis-
closure of each person's financial worth,33 something totally foreign
to the enforcement of commercial contracts where a confidential rela-
tionship does not exist,34 and in some instances representation by
counsel.
The issue that has caused special concern among lawyers and for
Professor Glendon is the time of determining the fairness of the terms
of an antenuptial agreement-either at the time of execution or at
the time of enforcement. Professor Glendon believes that using the
time of enforcement as the critical point to determine whether an
agreement is fair creates the same kind of uncertainty found in discre-
tionary distribution of property upon divorce, something she ab-
hors.35 This is a just criticism because so long as a disappointed
32 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 4.1 (2d ed. 1990).
33 See UNIF. PREMARIAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987). That section
reads as follows:
Section 6. Enforcement
(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom
enforcement is sought proves that:
(1) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
(2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and,
before execution of the agreement, that party:
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the prop-
erty or financial obligations of the other party;
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to
disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party
beyond the disclosure provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate
knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other
party.
(b) If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal
support and that modification or elimination causes one party to the agree-
ment to be eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the
time of separation or marital dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms
of the agreement, may require the other party to provide support to the
extent necessary to avoid that eligibility.
(c) An issue of unconscionability of a premarital agreement shall be de-
cided by the court as a matter of law.
Id.
34 See Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 389 N.E.2d 385 (Mass. 1979). Rosenbergwas the lead-
ing Massachusetts case on antenuptial agreements before Osborne v. Osborne, 428
N.E.2d 810 (Mass. 1981). In Rosenberg, the Supreme Judicial Court discussed how
parties to an antenuptial agreement do not deal at arms length, but rather in an
atmosphere of mutual trust.
35 See Glendon, Family Law Reform, supra note 5, at 1567. Professor Glendon dif-
ferentiates between childless marriages and marriages with children. She believes
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spouse can be successful in avoiding an agreement that was entered
into at the time of marriage, many years before the divorce, in an
atmosphere of complete openness, there is very little point in having
such agreements except to force a discussion of certain matters that
would ordinarily not be raised, or to serve as some kind of memoran-
dum of understanding. Supporting the principle that the date of en-
forcement should be the time for determining fairness is the fact that
antenuptial agreements can be modified or even rescinded during
marriage should changes occur in the couple's relationship. Such ac-
tions by spouses should not be considered extraordinary, since indi-
viduals who are sophisticated enough to sign antenuptial agreements
should be thoughtful enough to modify or rescind them. Also, de-
pending on the facts of a case, the defenses of a defective process or of
unconscionable terms can be raised in cases in which the result would
be extraordinarily unfair or unjust to the party seeking to avoid the
contract.
The issue of unfair or unjust antentuptial agreements may be-
come less frequent as more and more women (in the past usually the
economically disadvantaged person) obtain positions of equal impor-
tance and pay as their male counterparts and are able to accumulate
wealth not through inheritance, but by their own efforts.3 6 At the
that where a couple has children, "substantial limitations on freedom of con-
tract... are appropriate, at least if there are dependent children at the time of di-
vorce." Id.
Caselaw in Massachusetts supports this position. See, e.g., Osborne, 428 N.E.2d at
816; Knox v. Remick, 358 N.E.2d 432, 436 (1976).
36 Professor Brod has written:
Premarital agreements have a disparate impact on women-and thereby dis-
criminate against them. Thus, the enforcement of premarital agreements
implicates public policy concerns related to the eradication of gender dis-
crimination, as well as concerns with individual autonomy and "freedom of
contract" principles.
Premarital agreements should be greeted with skepticism, not em-
braced with enthusiasm. In addition to strengthening the "freedom of con-
tract" principle and supporting individual autonomy, the law governing the
enforcement of premarital agreements should be fashioned to effectuate
other public policies: the eradication of gender discrimination and the at-
tainment of economic justice for the economically vulnerable spouse at the
end of a marriage. The tension between these policies and the "freedom of
contract" principle can be reconciled by the adoption of a regime that en-
forces a premarital agreement only if the agreement attains economic justice
for the economically vulnerable spouse or, failing that, if the bargaining pro-
cess culminating in execution of the agreement was demonstrably fair. In
determining whether a premarital agreement should be enforced, the law
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present time, because of the uncertainty of the enforcement of ante-
nuptial agreements as written, even with procedural safeguards in
place (for example, representation by counsel), some lawyers refuse
to draft them for fear of malpractice actions brought by their clients
after their antenuptial agreements have been made ineffective.
IV. CONTRAcT COHABrrATION
Long before the three Marvin cases3 7 were decided, cohabitation
arrangements had been enforced using legal theories such as implied
partnership orjoint venture, constructive or resulting trust, or express
or implied contract.38 Yet the Marvin cases are perhaps one of the
most important set of cases in family law during the last quarter cen-
tury, because the California Supreme Court placed its judicial impri-
matur on the legality of two persons (nowhere in the opinion is the
relationship limited to heterosexuals) living together in a non-com-
mon law marriage jurisdiction in a sexual relationship. It is even
worth noting that the relationship began while one (in this case the
male) was still married. Marvin provided disappointed cohabitants
with a variety of legal theories for compensation upon break-up. No
may presume that an economically unjust agreement is the result of an un-
fair bargaining process and that an economicallyjust agreement is the result
of a fair process .... By enforcing agreements only if there are guarantees of
substantive or procedural fairness, the law will mitigate the disparate impact
of premarital agreements on women as a class, while avoiding paternalism
and respecting the rights of women (and men) to contract in their own
interests.
Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
229, 294-95 (1994).
Professor Brod states that "the law governing the enforcement of premarital
agreements should be fashioned to effectuate other public policies: the eradication of
gender discrimination and the attainment of economic justice for the economically
vulnerable spouse at the end of a marriage." Id. This description of a premarital
agreement suggests to me that the agreement should be considered as a special kind
of contract, perhaps like an adhesion contract, where the doctrines of public interest
and superior bargaining power play a role in interpretation and enforcement. See
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173,
1192-97 (1983).
37 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr.
555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Marvin v. Marvin, 5 FAM. L. REP. 3077 (1979).
38 See, e.g., Leong v. Leong, 27 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1928); In re Estate of Thornton,
499 P.2d 864 (Wash. 1972); Omerv. Omer, 523 P.2d 957 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). This
issue is discussed in WEYRAUCH ET AL, supra note 8. For a thorough review of the
extent to which Marvin has been followed in the United States, see Carol S. Bruch,
Cohabitation in the Common Law Countries a Decade After Marvin: Settled In or Moving
Ahead?, 22 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 717 (1989).
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longer was it necessary for lawyers or courts to create legal fictions or
try to interpret the facts to have them conform to some pre-existing
legal construct. Couples themselves could create an express cohabita-
tion agreement.
The initial reaction to the Marvin cases was by no means totally
positive. Illinois, a jurisdiction that seems particularly moralistic
where marital relationships are concerned,39 and which has held that
a divorced woman who lived with a man to whom she was not married
was unfit to care for her child,40 rejected the Marvin approach in
1979. In Hewitt v. Hewitt,41 the Supreme Court of Illinois refused to
provide a remedy to a woman, Victoria Hewitt, who had lived in a
marriage-like relationship for fifteen years, and in which she had
three children. Taking a particularly inflexible approach, the Illinois
court was unwilling to affirm the appellate court's decision, which had
been sympathetic to the woman's argument that she and her "com-
panion," with whom she shared the same last name, had lived a "con-
ventional married life," not as a formally married couple but as parties
to an express oral contract. The court would not enforce the woman's
contractual claim, holding that to do so would contravene Illinois'
public policy. That policy was reflected in the state's abolition of com-
mon law marriage in 1905 and its 1977 enactment of its marriage and
divorce law, which had rejected "no-fault" divorce. 42 The Supreme
Court of Illinois seemed to be concerned about how enforcement of
the Hewitt arrangement could be justified in a state that had recently
reaffirmed "the traditional doctrine that marriage is a civil contract
between three parties-the husband, the wife and the State." The
court also stated that Illinois had a strong interest in maintaining the
marriage contract as one that cannot be terminated at will. To the
court, the Hewitt arrangement was a "private contractual alternative to
marriage." In other words, the court seemed to be saying that en-
forcement of a cohabitation contract reflected values the Illinois court
39 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, the United States
Supreme Court struck down an Illinois statute that prevented a biological father from
participating in a child protection case which would have deprived him of the custody
of his children. Mr. Stanley had lived with the mother of the children in a family
arrangement. Yet, by virtue of his not having married the mother of the children, the
Illinois statute did not provide him with notice or an opportunity to be heard at the
hearing.
40 SeeJarrett v.Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1980) (enforcing 449 U.S. 927 (1980)).
41 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).
42 Illinois enacted its no-fault provision in 1995. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/
401(a) (2) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
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did not choose to advance. To do so would send the wrong message
to Illinois citizens.
Judicial restraint may be another reason why the Supreme Court
of Illinois refused to follow Marvin. Illinois courts had developed a
pattern of deferring to the legislature in cases without Illinois prece-
dent. For example, in 1963 the Illinois Appellate Court was asked to
decide a case which would have established a new tort for wrongful
birth. In Zepeda v. Zepeda,43 an illegitimate child sued his biological
father in tort for causing him to be born "an adulterine bastard."44 In
affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the court wrote, "The inter-
est of society is so involved, the action needed to redress the tort could
be so far-reaching that the policy of the State should be declared by
the representatives of the people."45 This statement is similar in effect
to the one made by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Mogged v.
Mogged,46 where that court was unwilling to abolish or modify the de-
fense of recrimination in divorce:
Whether or not the defense of recrimination should be abolished
or modified in Illinois is a question involving complex public-policy
considerations as to which compelling arguments may be made on
both sides. For the reasons stated hereafter, we believe that these
questions are appropriately within the province of the legislature,
and that, if there is to be a change in the law of this State on this
matter, it is for the legislature and not the courts to bring about that
change.47
Hewitt is a particularly troublesome decision from a woman's
point of view. Victoria Hewitt relied on Robert Hewitt's statement
that a formal marriage ceremony was not necessary for the couple to
be considered married in Iowa, a common law marriage jurisdiction,
where their relationship began while they attended college. He gave
her every indication that theirs would be a shared relationship. Since
the support of the Hewitt children was not a part of the case, the loser
was Victoria Hewitt. She not only cared for the couple's children and
the house, but also assisted Robert Hewitt financially in securing his
professional degree so that he could establish a pedodontia practice,
again with her money. If ever there was a case to which the Marvin
remedies should have applied, it was Hewitt.
43 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
44 Id at 850.
45 Id at 859.
46 302 N.E.2d 293 (Ill. 1973).
47 Id. at 225.
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In Morone v. Morone,4 8 the highest court in New York refused to
imply a contract from the conduct of the parties, but would have en-
forced an express contract. Like "Mrs." Hewitt, "Mrs." Morone had
given birth to children fathered by Mr. Morone. She and Mr. Morone
lived together for eight years, while holding themselves out to the
community as a married couple. Their long term relationship based
on a contract was both for domestic and business purposes.
"Mrs." Morone sought, among other claims, to have Mr. Morone
account for the moneys he had received during their contract of part-
nership. In dismissing "Mrs." Morone's complaint in the lower court,
the judge interpreted her claim as an attempt to recover for
"housewifely" duties within a marriage-type relationship. The Appel-
late Division affirmed the trial court because of "Mrs." Morone's fail-
ure to assert an express agreement.
In writing for the majority of the court, Judge Meyer pointed out
that he was following precedent by requiring an express contract be-
tween a non-married couple that did not include illicit sexual rela-
tions as part of the consideration.4 9 He alluded to the fact that to
enforce an implied-in-fact contract would be tantamount to resur-
recting common law marriage, which the state had abolished. In addi-
tion, Judge Meyer listed a series of questions that he felt made a court-
imposed contract (implied-in-fact) problematical. 50
The trial court's statement that "Mrs." Morone's claim was for
compensation for "housewifely" duties and therefore without merit il-
lustrates the confusion about recovery in cohabitation relationships.
The old common law view was that a wife performs household duties,
not with the expectation of payment, but out of a legal obligation: a
wife owes her husband the duty to perform household services. Also,
a common law presumption exists that spouses act not for individual
48 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980).
49 This argument was also stated in Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal.
1976) when Justice Tobriner wrote: "As we have explained, the courts now hold that
express agreements will be enforced unless they rest on an unlawful meretricious
consideration."
50 Judge Meyer asked:
Is the length of time the relationship has continued a factor? Do the princi-
ples apply only to accumulated personal property or do they encompass
earnings as well? If earnings are to be included how are the services of the
homemaker to be valued? Should services which are generally regarded as
amenities of cohabitation be included? Is there unfairness in compensating
an unmarried renderer of domestic services but failing to accord the same
rights to the legally married homemaker? Are the varying types of remedies
allowed mutually exclusive or cumulative?
Morone, 413 N.E.2d at 1156.
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profit or advancement, but for altruistic motives. Yet the New York
trial court applied the presumption to a marriage-like relationship.
Thus, "Mrs." Morone was in a "no win" situation.
What should recovery be in termination of cohabitation con-
tracts? If there is to be a meaningful distinction between formal or
informal marriage and cohabitation contracts, then there ought to be
distinct recoveries upon termination. Implied or express cohabitation
contracts should be enforced, but the divorce model should not be
used for fashioning the remedy.51 Surely one who terminates a cohab-
itation arrangement should not be required to support the other per-
son in the same sense as alimony is used (based on need unless clear
expectations have been expressed in a contract). "Palimony," the
word that has been coined to relate to a cohabitation contract rem-
edy, is misleading since it implies alimony, which is a support obliga-
tion only awarded upon a divorce.
Professor Glendon makes a strong case in her opposition to ap-
plying the same discretionary rules for property distribution upon di-
vorce to termination of cohabitation contracts. She has written that in
Kansas, Mississippi, and Washington, where courts distribute cohabi-
tants' property as they do in divorce cases, cohabitants share with mar-
ried couples the "same degree of uncertainty about their economic
rights as the legislatures in their unfathomable wisdom have granted
to married couples." 52 However, applying the divorce model of equi-
table distribution of property to a cohabiting couple does make sense
where property has been acquiredjoindy with the expectation that it
would be jointly enjoyed.53
51 However, that is precisely what the California Superior Court did when it
heard Marvin on remand from the Supreme Court of California. It awarded Michelle
Marvin $104,000 "for rehabilitation purposes." Marvin v. Marvin, 5 FAM. L. REP. 3077,
3085 (1979). That award was reversed on appeal. See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr.
555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). Thus, after at least five years of litigation, Michelle Marvin
received nothing.
In Wilcox v. Trautz, No. SJC-07621 (Mass. April 21, 1998), the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts enforced a cohabitation agreement between a man and a wo-
man, which had been entered into during the period in which they lived together. In
the course of the opinion, Justice Greaney briefly reviewed the status of persons in
Massachusetts who live together without going through a ceremonial marriage. He
stated, "we do not recognize common law marriage, do not extend to unmarried
couples the rights possessed by married couples who divorce, and reject equitable
remedies that might have the effect of dividing property between unmarried parties."
Id., slip op. at 4.
52 GLENDON, supra note 2, at 281.
53 See Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990). In Goode, the couple had
lived together for twenty-eight years, had four children, and had held themselves out
to the community as husband and wife. West Virginia does not recognize common
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Couples living under a contract of cohabitation have not received
the same kind of legal protection that exists in an informal or formal
marriage.5 4 And except in limited circumstances, there does not seem
to be any legislative movement to extend such protection. The cohab-
itation relationship is not considered confidential, and therefore an
individual cannot claim any privilege to prevent a conversation with
his or her companion from being revealed in court. Wherever status,
rather than dependency, is the basis for obtaining financial benefits,
cohabitants do not qualify. 55
There is a limit to which cohabiting couples enjoy the economic
advantages of marriage. Perhaps the most important restriction is
that unless the survivor of the relationship has left a valid will, he or
she has no statutory rights in the decedent's estate. 56 Cases have held
that a cohabitant cannot recover for loss of consortium 57 or wrongful
death. 5s Nor can a cohabitant recover social security benefits.5 9 Judi-
cial responses to attempts by cohabitants to recover for workmen's
compensation benefits have not been uniform.60
At least two jurisdictions have allowed a same sex cohabitation
couple to adopt a child who was the biological offspring of one of the
law marriage and therefore divorce was not available. Yet the West Virginia Supreme
Court applied a divorce-like remedy, considering such factors as "the purpose, dura-
tion, and stability of the relationship and the expectation of the parties." Id at 438.
See also Warden v. Warden, 676 P.2d 1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). In Warden, the
Washington Court of Appeals treated the couple as married for purposes of the distri-
bution of assets upon the termination of their relationship.
54 See Bruch, supra note 38, at 727-40.
55 See Grace C. Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28
UCLA L. REv. 1125, 1140-49 (1981).
56 Even where there is a will and the testator leaves his estate to his companion,
an attack of undue influence can be successful in defeating the will. Such was the
case of In re Will of Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1964), aff'd, 205 N.E.2d
864 (N.Y. 1965). In that case, the heirs of Robert Kaufmann were successful in defeat-
ing the claim of Walter Weiss, Mr. Kaufmann's companion, on the ground of undue
influence even though the testator had left a letter to his family describing his rela-
tionship with Mr. Weiss, his intention to leave him an inheritance, and his hope that
his family would be pleased with his gratitude toward his friend. The case is discussed
in Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REv. 571 (1997).
57 See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988); Feliciano v. Rosemar Sil-
ver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095 (Mass. 1987).
58 See, e.g., Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 184 Cal. Rptr. 390 (Ct. App. 1982).
59 See, e.g., Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979).
60 See Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 663 P.2d 904 (Cal. 1983) (dis-
allowing recovery of workman's compensation benefits). But see MacGregor v. Unem-
ployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 689 P.2d 453 (Cal. 1984) (allowing recovery). See also OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. §656.226 (Butterworth 1989).
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cohabitants. 61 This may be an important development in legally rec-
ognizing a cohabitation arrangement as establishing the first step in
the formation of a family unit.
Without the legal sanction of cohabitation contracts, it does not
seem possible that the current trend of municipalities enacting do-
mestic partnership laws could have occurred. These domestic part-
nership laws are a successful attempt to regulate cohabitation
contracts. Not only do they set down formal requirements for the es-
tablishment of the relationship 62 (regardless of the sexual orientation
of the couple), but they also provide the formal requirements for ter-
mination of the relationship. 63 In a certain sense the domestic part-
nership laws define what some may say is the ideal marriage: an
intimate relationship based on mutual trust and support.
For the most part, municipal domestic partnership laws are
designed to provide cohabiting couples who have fulfilled the require-
ments of the registration law with employment benefits, most notably
health care and sick leave. Objections to passing municipal domestic
partnership laws have been based on economic reasons: enacting such
laws will increase municipal budgets because of the need for more
money to pay for additional employee benefits. Whether these argu-
ments mask moral objections is not at all clear.
What is interesting about the domestic partnership law phenome-
non is that so far no state has enacted a domestic partnership registra-
tion law. The Massachusetts State Senate passed one,64 but it is
unlikely that the State's House of Representatives will also pass the bill
anytime soon. Should a state enact a domestic partnership law that
recognizes cohabitation, and sets requirements for establishing and
terminating the relationship, will other states give it full faith and
credit? If one applies the conventional conflict of laws rules gov-
erning the recognition of contracts, cohabitation contracts should be
recognized in other states.
61 See In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); Adoptions of
B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A-2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
62 At least two jurisdictions have required that a cohabitation contract be in writ-
ing. See MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075-.076 (1989); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 26.01(b) (3) (West 1987).
63 See SAN FRANcIsco RECOGNITION OF DOMESTIC PARTNERS LAw § 121, reprinted in
WEYRAUCH ET AL, supra note 8, at 304-06.
64 S.B. 1994, 180th Gen. Court, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Mass.) (introduced Oct. 30,
1997).
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V. DIVORCE
Professor Glendon has lamented the "withering away of marriage
as a legal institution" and the ease in which married couples can ter-
minate their relationship. 65 She is particularly critical of those juris-
dictions which blur the distinction between spousal support and
marital property. She questions the assumptions courts make about
spousal self-sufficiency after divorce when awarding alimony or as-
signing property. And she believes equitable distribution statutes are
an invitation to judges to use their discretion-in other words, per-
sonal values-in deciding the economic post-divorce life of the
couple. 66
Professor Glendon has posed the question as to whether the dis-
cretionary distribution of marital assets in any way reflects either the
intent or the behavior of a marital couple. She thinks not. Nor does
she believe that couples in an ongoing marital relationship either in-
tend or practice a partnership-like relationship or would like to sub-
ject their property, no matter how acquired, to be split according to
the discretion of a judge.67 She reserves her severest criticism for the
legal assumption, manifested either in statutes or by judicial action,
that marriage is a "partnership of two equal individuals who may have
been economically interdependent in marriage, but who are at least
potentially independent upon divorce.
6
Treating a marriage as a partnership contract does not necessar-
ily have to result in devastating economic consequences. If one were
to consider marriage as a true partnership, certain benefits would ac-
crue. What is the modem marriage? It is a contract in the sense that
has already been described. It is also a partnership in that it is a fidu-
ciary relationship of two individuals who retain their individuality,
who love each other, and who share in and expect to reach mutual
aspirations. Marital partners lead their lives with the hope that their
conjugal and financial partnership will last. To that end each makes
his or her contribution. Like some commercial partnerships, one per-
son may contribute capital, the other may contribute human
resources.
But the modern marriage partnership deviates from the commer-
cial partnership in that, in making a contribution, one of the partners
may have to make certain sacrifices, such as abandoning a career en-
tirely or suspending one's plans for an uncertain future. Consistent
65 GLENDON, supra note 2, at 197-99.
66 See id. at 228-33; GLENDON, supra note 1, at 65.
67 See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 65.
68 GLENDON, supra note 2, at 233.
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with partnership law, however, is the principle that a partner cannot
benefit himself by using partnership assets to advance his self interest.
If he does, the benefit accrues to the partnership.69 This is consistent
with the emphasis that current laws dealing with equitable distribution
place on contribution. One spouse may invest in the other spouse as
part of the plans for the partnership. This investment may include
contributing financially and emotionally to the spouse's education, ca-
reer advancement, or business. It is unrealistic to think that any per-
son entering into a partnership would expect to leave the partnership
less economically secure than when she entered it.
How should assets be distributed following marital failure?70
Should there be a fifty-fifty split or should each case be examined on
an individual basis? Professor Glendon recommends an equal distri-
bution, and that spousal support remain distinct from the assignment
of marital property. She also urges judges to be mindful of the lives
post-divorce women lead. In the main, the burden falls on them to
provide a home and comfort for the children of the divorcing parents.
Also, given the current economic conditions, they suffer from employ-
ment inequalities. They are the ones who become impoverished upon
divorce.
Before the adoption of equitable distribution in non-community
property states, the title theory dominated. The old adage, "He who
owns the property, gets the property," was followed. This unfair
method of allocating property upon divorce allowed for no inquiry
into the time of purchase, the use to which the property was put, or
the identity of the person who was responsible for the appreciation of
the property (not necessarily the same person who made the initial
69 See Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV.
595, 607-10 (1997).
70 The three questions asked in the assignment of property upon divorce in an
equitable distribution jurisdiction are: (1) what is marital property; (2) when should it
be valued; and (3) how should it be distributed. In order to answer the first question,
courts have come up with three concepts: tracing, commingling, and transmutation.
Tracing of assets consists of determining the source of the use of marital funds. Com-
mingling takes place where separate funds are brought into the marriage but become
commingled with other assets so as to be untraceable. Transmutation of an asset is
the term used to describe the change in character of the property from separate to
marital or from marital to separate. This can be accomplished through use, contract,
or gifL For an illustration of the application of these concepts, see Quinn v. Quinn,
512 A.2d 848 (R.I. 1986). For a discussion of the concepts, see J. Thomas Oldham,
Tracing Commingling and Transmutation, 23 FAM. L.Q. 219 (1989).
As to when marital property should be valued, three reference points are rele-
vant: time of separation, time of the petition for divorce, and time of the divorce
hearing.
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financial investment).71 Basically, in many instances the title theory
masked a reality favoring men.
A fifty-fifty split in property may be an easy formula for a termina-
tion of a commercial partnership, and may underscore the sense of
community in a marriage. But it may result in unfairness in a mar-
riage.7 2 There are too many variables in a marriage to support a
mechanical formula. One of the most important variables is the
length of the marriage. The key is the contribution of the individual
to the marriage. If equitable distribution laws, like those modeled af-
ter Section 307 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,73 are ap-
plied with attention to current case law, they provide a fair method for
distributing assets upon divorce. Rather than a mechanical formula
or unlimited judicial discretion, they require a judge to consider cer-
tain factors. If a judge is required to make a finding for each factor,
abuse of discretion can be checked on appeal. Also, the statutory fac-
tors provide attorneys with a checklist and a way of organizing their
evidence for litigation. Legal scholarship may have a function here to
keep watch that neither judges nor legislators continue to apply dated
societal values.
71 See GLENDON, supra note 2.
72 Professor Glendon recommends a fifty-fifty split "limited to property acquired
by gainful activity during the marriage, in the absence of agreement to the contrary."
GLENDON, supra note 1, at 63. Professor Glendon sees the difficulty in defending her
rule as one of fairness, but "given what is just as true-that no human judge can ever
ascertain or quantify the true contribution of each spouse-the equal division of ac-
quests commends itself as a rule of convenience without substantial demerit." Id.
73 Section 307 [Alternative A] reads as follows:
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage, separation, or disposition
of property following a decree of dissolution of marriage or legal separation
by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or
lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court, without regard to
marital misconduct, shall, and in a proceeding for legal separation may, fi-
nally equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets be-
longing to either or both however and whenever acquired, and whether the
title thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or both. In making ap-
portionment the court shall consider the duration of the marriage, any prior
marriage of either party, antenuptial agreement of the parties, the age,
health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial
provisions, whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to mainte-
nance, and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets
and income. The court shall also consider the contribution or dissipation of
each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in
value of the respective estates, and the contribution of a spouse as a home-
maker or to the family unit.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE Acr § 307 (Alternative A), 9A U.L.A. 238 (1973).
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The new property, of which Professor Glendon has written, is
now part of both equitable distribution statutes and case law. Now, a
wife who puts her husband through professional school can acquire a
return on that investment by having an interest in his professional
degree or license.74 She can receive a share of his pension and an
interest in his business.75 The husband who helps to build the career
of his wife who becomes a celebrity may expect to obtain an interest in
that career.7 6 A homemaker who stays home to care for children may
be compensated for her services by considering those services as a
human capital contribution to the partnership. 77 Consideration of, or
recovery for, any of these contributions would have been unthinkable
before equitable distribution became law. Today, divorce need not
result in looking at the marriage partnership as an investment that did
not pay off at all.
VI. CONCLUSION
Professor Mary Ann Glendon's family law scholarship has greatly
illuminated the difficulties that exist in trying to fit such family law
matters as antenuptial agreements, cohabitation contracts, and prop-
erty assignment upon divorce into neat legal constructs. The tension
between adhering to traditional rules of contract or partnership law,
and considering the unique social policy considerations in marriage,
causes a certain amount of distortion. How can private ordering be
respected or even encouraged if legal recognition is in doubt? Is fam-
ily law, ordinarily classified as private law, moving toward being con-
sidered as public law? Will the questions posed in matters dealing
with antenuptial agreements, cohabitation contracts, and property set-
tlement agreements be similar to those asked when legislation is being
74 See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985). In O'Brien, the Court of
Appeals of New York applied the New York Domestic Relations Law and considered
Dr. O'Brien's license to practice medicine as marital property. New York is the only
state that considers a license or a degree as property. The more common method of
including it as part of the marital estate is to consider it as providing the holder of the
degree as having an enhanced earning capacity because of the contribution of the
supporting spouse and including it in an alimony award. For a full discussion of this
issue, see AMERICAN LAW INSTrTUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.07 (Proposed Final Draft Part I, February 14,
1997).
75 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.08 (Proposed Final Draft Part I, February 14,
1997).
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interpreted? Must those kinds of private agreements serve the public
interest to be enforced?
If we move away from the protection of the individual in family
law matters, and toward communal values, we shall be breaking with
fundamental traditions in this country. In the case of marriage, for
example, communal values and public policy considerations may treat
that relationship as a vehicle to enforce national concerns, for exam-
ple in regard to national morality. The concept of privacy and individ-
ual assertion of rights, if only within a contractual context, may be in
flux and changing. This leaves a number of questions unanswered, at
least at this stage. A scholar with the breadth and ingenuity of Profes-
sor Mary Ann Glendon is ideally suited to cope with these evolutions,
which by no means relate only to marriage and cohabitation, but can
be witnessed in any aspect of private and public life.
